The World Minus One Will Be a Mess

Last week, President Donald Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from 66 separate multilateral forums. He has retracted billions of dollars in spending for international organizations; pulled back from the United Nations; withdrawn from global climate talks as well as the World Health Organization (WHO), UNESCO, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and more; and paused funding for the World Trade Organization (WTO). The recent announcement added a slew of U.N. subsidiaries and international consortia to the dustbin of Washington’s multilateral engagement. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is building a reputation as a global spoiler, bending norms against the use of force to the breaking point, threatening the essence of NATO with its designs on the Danish territory of Greenland, and scuttling consensus on global agreements on ship pollution and ocean plastics.

In a recent piece in Foreign Policy titled “The World-Minus-One Moment,” Amitav Acharya optimistically argued that the global community should keep calm and carry on, working together to assure that multilateralism survives Trump’s assault. Acharya paints a rosy scenario of an order that emerges stronger from beneath the foot its longtime hegemon. Sadly, this is unlikely to happen. The Trump administration’s unceremonious exit comes at a time when the multilateral system faces its own pressures: outdatedness and a chronic failure to reform, entrenched hostility among great powers, seismic technological change, and a mismatch between mission and resources. Against that backdrop, where multilateralists such as Acharya envision the rise of “the Rest,” we are instead more likely to see a mix of zombie multilateralism and the dawning of a Chinese Century.

The rise of the Rest. In this optimistic scenario, a group of middle powers and an active civil society would unite to uphold a more broad-based multilateral system. European nations and countries such as Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, and others have long been leaders in various facets of the universal order. A step removed from great-power conflict, these governments have brought principled and pragmatic approaches on international justice, nonproliferation, and human rights paradigms such as the Responsibility to Protect or the bans on land mines and cluster munitions. For those with less economic and military heft, evolution toward a “might makes right” system dominated by great powers is a dark scenario. Middle powers and small states collectively control most votes in the U.N. General Assembly and could in theory join forces to create a more open and pluralistic system.

While such an approach would delight multilateral enthusiasts, it faces substantial hurdles. For middle powers with distinct priorities, concerns, and loyalties, to coalesce in shared leadership is asking a lot. While the European Union has the throw weight and money to potentially lead such a coalition, a combination of anti-Western sentiments and the current European preoccupations with Ukraine, rearmament, and more makes the timing inopportune. Other middle powers are likely unable or unwilling to step up financially as underwriters of the system. Moreover, the fossilized U.N. Security Council would limit the influence of any such middle-power collective, disincentivizing it.

Zombie multilateralism. In this scenario, an alphabet soup of global deliberative bodies, including the 66 that Trump just withdrew from, could limp along with diminished funding, force, and relevance. There is already drift in this direction, with influential heads of state skipping high-level U.N. meetings and the Security Council’s emergency convening on Venezuela fizzling. If Washington makes good on its threat to pull U.N. funding, the multilateral system will be hobbled, probably permanently. There will be ample incentive to sustain practical organs such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, which regulates airline flights, and the International Telecommunication Union, which allocates satellite orbits and helps ensure that phones work across borders; the United States has not withdrawn from these and other technical bodies. There will be some ongoing role for the Security Council, which the Trump administration has found it useful to ratify efforts conceived elsewhere, such as the nascent international stabilization force for Gaza or ongoing multinational security efforts in Haiti. The administration has also backpedaled on plans to withhold support from the U.N.’s humanitarian system, arriving at a deal with the United Nations involving $2 billion in funding tied to reforms.  There’s a chance that Washington wakes up the value of other bodies as well. But short of such reversals, the WTO and organizations dealing with global economic development, health, human rights, and even peace and security could steadily wither from lack of capacity, fragmented political will, and the Trump administration’s push to center the action in places it can better control.

The laundry list of commissions, panels, and committees that the Trump administration is abandoning—many of them little known even to foreign affairs experts—reflects an international system run amok, where multiplying mandates are created and few are ever retired or consolidated. The world body’s hamstrung governance, requiring member state approval to eliminate or consolidate functions, makes it tough to emulate corporate behemoths, like IBM or Procter & Gamble, that jettisoned outdated arms to reinvent themselves for new eras. In some cases, stagnation will likely yield quiet deaths from the natural cause of institutional obsolescence; few outside U.N. corridors would mourn the streamlining of the Economic and Social Council or the declining Register of Conventional Arms, both on Trump’s exit list. But in other areas, the loss or weakening of lifesaving programs such as the WHO and U.N. Population Fund will result in more disease, suffering, and death.

The Chinese Century. Since Trump retook the White House, Chinese President Xi Jinping has played a triple game: going toe-to-toe with Washington while also seeking to cultivate Trump and, simultaneously, to rise above the fray as a responsible stakeholder and foil to the White House’s chaos machine. While China has already indicated that it does not intend to foot Washington’s unpaid international bills, it is making shrewd use of the U.S. turnabout to cement its own leadership. China has stepped up with a five-year, $500 million commitment to the WHO and reupped funding for the China-U.N. Peace and Development Fund, a kitty to finance Beijing-approved projects. Beijing has also upped its commitment to curb greenhouse gasses, reinforcing its role as the global climate pacesetter, and positioned itself to lead on governance artificial intelligence. In December 2025, China’s U.N. mission announced and hosted the launch of a “Group of Friends of Global Governance,” a standing coalition dedicated to implementing Xi’s Global Governance Initiative.

For Beijing to fill the gap left by Washington is hardly a like-for-like substitution. As evidenced by the growing practice of countries earmarking U.N. funds for pet projects, and by the chronic underresourcing of the U.N. human rights pillar, traditional notions of a “values-based” order are already giving way to a more coldly transactional international system. Over time, liberal beliefs threaded into the founding of the U.N. system may not just fray but be rewoven along illiberal and authoritarian patterns. China’s fealty to great-power sovereignty and noninterference; rejection of universal human rights in favor of relative and contextual approaches; disregard for the roles of civil society and the press; trade protectionism; and prioritization of the state over the individual are all predictable characteristics of a Chinese-led multilateral order. After the United States halted engagement with the Human Rights Council in February 2025, China and Russia have pushed in U.N. budget negotiations to cut or block funding for parts of the U.N. human rights system, including some monitoring and investigative mechanisms.

Some multilateralists profess openness toward a global system “made in China.” If Beijing is willing to step up where Washington is pulling back, we should not assume the worst or reject Chinese contributions, the thinking goes. But the legitimacy of the post-World War II order comes not just from the wide participation of governments but from the universal values that, however incompletely realized, are part of the DNA of the global system. These values have shaped an order that serves not just states but also dissidents and freedom fighters, human rights and justice. They are why legions of NGOs and civil society organizations turn to the U.N. to advance their causes. With those values shunted aside and voices shut out, the international order left behind will be colder and crueler.

More likely than the full realization of any one scenario for the future of multilateralism is some kind of uneasy amalgamation. Some U.N. entities will wither. Beijing will dominate select arenas. And, ideally, a coalition of middle powers will stir to safeguard key interests and buttress institutions where they value their seats and say. The net result is likely to be a weaker, more Chinese-dominated world order where powers with a commitment to liberal values find themselves playing perpetual defense.

For decades, U.S. policy toward the U.N. and multilateralism has been caught between two poles. Those in the tradition of former Sen. Jesse Helms and National Security Advisor John Bolton have argued that the United States has more to lose than gain from a multilateral system bent on tying Washington down. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, President Barack Obama, and others argued that, despite the frustrations of engaging in global bodies, active U.S. involvement is an essential safeguard for the country’s security and priorities. The next few years may finally settle that debate, with the Trump administration’s dramatic exit offering a real-world test case of what actually happens in America’s absence, both to the global order and to U.S. national interests.

If the multilateralists are proved right and a future administration reverts to the long-held view (consistently backed by Americans in polls) that the United States must remain part of the system, a new set of challenges will emerge. The current trajectory of bellicosity, disrespect for rules, and debt-dodging will leave Washington’s multilateral reputation in tatters. Still, the U.S. economy, military capabilities, and technological prowess will keep its seat warm, enabling it to return to the table no matter what. To take advantage of what has made multilateral forums useful to the United States—the ability to lead and marshal followers—a future U.S. administration will need to bend over backward to prove that it is no longer a shirker. It will need to prepay its dues, make binding commitments that transcend domestic political shifts, and demonstrate bipartisan consensus for a rebooted approach. Like any ruptured connection, the U.S. relationship to the world order will need to be painstakingly rebuilt. Washington will need to show generosity, self-awareness, and a willingness to listen. It will also need to find ways to remind the world how its leadership can still serve as a force for good.