Both Sides Want a Deal. Both Keep Acting As if They Don’t.

Think of all the sparring ahead of the second round of U.S.-Iran negotiations as the World Series of Brinkmanship. The two sides are on a slippery slope above an abyss, and they bizarrely seem convinced that it’s the path to success rather than disaster.

The balancing act got trickier Tuesday, as President Donald Trump’s negotiating team delayed its departure for a new round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, to force the Iranians to clarify what concessions they’re willing to make. Trump then extended an ultimatum that was set to expire on Wednesday to allow a divided Iranian leadership time to make up its mind before he attacks Iranian bridges, power plants and other civilian targets.

Trump, in effect, has opened the door with his extension, rather than slamming it shut. If Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf can’t deliver, then the world will know the grim answer and can act accordingly.

I’ve never seen a negotiation that’s quite like this one. The American and Iranian sides aren’t just bargaining over the “shape of the table,” as happens in many negotiations, but whether there should be a table at all. Both sides act as if the only way to get to “yes” is to keep saying “no.”

Trump and the Iranians both appear to enjoy this game of chicken. Both seem to want a deal but insist that they don’t need it—and that the other side wants it more. Both are hurting economically, but they boast they’re willing to keep fighting indefinitely. Every time they near an exit ramp, they veer away.

When I visited a carpet bazaar in Tehran 15 years ago, I was advised never to hint that I wanted to buy a carpet. The only way to get a good deal was to convince the merchant that I was ready to walk away. I’ve never been in a major real estate deal, but I assume it has a similar dynamic.

These two bargainers have been working so hard to convince the other side they’re ready to walk that they may be forced to do just that—and continue the next round of war. But that would probably be a bargaining ploy, too.

Trump has relished trash-talking as he pushes for a favorable peace agreement. He’ll talk one day about “obliterating” Iranian civilization, and a week later he’ll offer the promise, as he did Tuesday in an interview with CNBC, that Iran “can make themselves into a strong nation again, a wonderful nation again” by making a good bargain.

Trump loves setting deadlines and making ultimatums—and then extending them—and the Iranian side acts unimpressed. As Wednesday’s deadline approached, Trump had repeated his threat to bomb civilian infrastructure. When people accuse Trump of contemplating a war crime, he appears unfazed—as if the charge adds luster to his threat. Shock is part of the game.

The tit-for-tat over the Strait of Hormuz has been part of the pre-negotiation sparring. Iran announced it was closing the passage just after the first meeting in Islamabad because the ceasefire discussed there didn’t apply to Lebanon. When Trump then forced Israel to accept a Lebanon ceasefire, Iran reciprocated by opening the strait, assuming that Trump would respond in kind by lifting his blockade. He didn’t—creating a new moment of escalation.

Then Iran attacked ships in the strait; the U.S. Navy attacked and seized an Iranian vessel, and now we have a delay or perhaps postponement of the Islamabad meeting.

Given the stakes, you’d think that Trump would want de-escalation. But that’s not the way he operates. He likes disorder and destabilization—and seems ready to keep extending the state of uncertainty. He seems to think that creating and tolerating instability is his secret power. But with his extension he may have moved toward a more stable negotiation platform. The financial markets have been so convinced that Trump will make a deal in the end that they’ve been discounting the trash talk, reciprocal blockades and negotiating delays. Tuesday’s events make that look like a wise bet, but we’ll see.

Herman Kahn, who truly was a master strategist, warned in his 1965 book On Escalation: “Many people would like to conduct international relations the way a teenager plays ‘chicken.’ They believe that if our decision-makers can only give the appearance of being drunk, blind, and without a steering wheel, they will ‘win’ in negotiation.” That sounds like a pretty good description of how Trump bargains, and the brink-loving Iranians, too.

But Kahn cautioned about the danger of playing ‘chicken’ in global negotiations: “I do not consider this a useful or responsible policy. We may be willing to run some risks, and we may not want to hem ourselves in tactically by seeming completely sober, clear-visioned, and in full control of ourselves, but we will obviously benefit by having a reasonable degree of sobriety, a reasonable degree of clear vision, and a reasonable degree of self-control.”

One explanation for the bluster on both sides is a need to cover what will be painful compromises. Trump seems ready to accept a deal that’s modestly better than the 2015 Iran nuclear deal but contains many similar provisions. It appears likely to include a total ban on enrichment, but for a limited time, perhaps as little as 10 years.

Iran will probably agree to remove its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. But, as with the earlier Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, compliance will depend on monitoring and inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And a deal is likely to include the release of frozen Iranian assets, as the earlier one did. Trump will insist on at least nominal limits on Iranian missiles and support for proxies. But this will be far from the “unconditional surrender” Trump wanted when the war began.

The Strait of Hormuz will be “open” when the war finally ends—by negotiation or military force. But Iran has now demonstrated that it can use this navigational version of a nuclear weapon—and that the world has few good ways to prevent it. If a deal emerges, Trump should include an international supervisory mechanism to oversee freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. That international flavor isn’t his style, but it’s essential.

Trump has now presented the Iranian regime with a real choice: It can suffer continuous pressure, military and otherwise, on its armed forces and economy. Or it can take his invitation to become a modern, pragmatic nation that normalizes relations with the United States and gains the economic and political benefits. Can Ghalibaf make that deal, or is he facing too much resistance from hard-liners back home, who don’t want any agreement with the “Great Satan”?

When you pull back the camera, that’s what this crazy negotiation is about. Perhaps Trump is trying a new tactic as the endgame approaches: treat his adversary as a real nation—and find if it’s ready to act like one.

This article was originally published in the Washington Post and republished here as part of a regular syndication of David Ignatius’s work.